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NOTES
A FIRST AMENDMENT JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULATING RACIST
SPEECH ON CAMPUS*
This Note outlines a first amendment justification for reg-
ulating racist speech at state universities. The analysis shows
that while discussions of racial issues further the underlying
philosphies of the first amendment, racist epithets thwart the
philosophical objectives that free expression was designed to
protect. The discussion provides a guide for how such regula-
tions could be validated within the first amendment tradition
despite the presumptions against group libel statutes and con-
tent-based restrictions. The special interests of the university
community and the psychological well-being of minority stu-
dents argue for more leniency in evaluating the regulation of
racist speech on campus than would be permissible in the com-
munity at large. This Note proposes a model university code
for regulating racist epithets. While the model code prohibits
racist epithets, it assures protection for discussion of racial is-
sues that promotes first amendment values.
everywhere the crosses are burning,
sharp-shooting goose-steppers around every corner,
there are snipers in the schools ...
(I know you don't believe this.
You think this is nothing
but faddish exaggeration. But they
* I would like to thank Professors Jonathan Entin and William Marshall and Dean
Melvyn Durchslag for their comments and encouragement. I would also like to thank Anne
Morgan and Melissa Sternlicht for their editorial contributions.
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are not shooting at you.)
Lorna Dee Cervantes1
IN 1987 AT the University of Michigan, a group of black women
were in a meeting when a fellow student shoved a leaflet under
the door. The leaflet read, "blacks 'don't belong in classrooms,
they belong hanging from trees.' "2 In response to this and similar
incidents,3 the University of Michigan enacted an anti-discrimina-
tion policy in the fall of 1988." The Michigan policy punished 5
speech that victimizes students on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity,
religion or sexual preference, interferes with academic efforts or
"[c]reates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for
educational pursuits."'
I. Cervantes, Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me How l, An Intelligent
Well-Read Person Could Believe in the War between Races, in CONTEMPORARY CHICANA
POETRY 90 (1986), quoted in Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering
the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2335 (1989).
2. Wilkerson, Campus Blacks Feel Racism's Nuances, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, §
1, at 1, col. 2; see Racism, Cynicism, Musical Chairs, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 1988, at
30.
3. A leaflet distributed in a Michigan dormitory in 1987 declared "open season" on
blacks. Sector, A New Bigotry Ripples Across U.S. Campuses, L.A. Times, May 8, 1988,
§ 1, at 1, col. 2. In the spring of 1989, another flier named the month of April "White
Pride Time" featuring events like "'counciling [sic] sessions on how to deal with uppity
niggers.'" Woolridge, Race Relations on Campus: University of Michigan, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 5, 1989, § A, at 29, col. 2. Also at the University of Michigan, "the campus radio
station broadcast a call from a student who joked: 'Why do blacks always have sex on their
minds? Because their pubic hair is on their head. . . . Who are the two most famous black
women in history? Aunt Jemima and Mother Fucker.'" Weiner, Reagan's Children: Ra-
cial Hatred on Campus, THE NATION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 260. During the 1988 academic
year at the University of Michigan racial tensions were amplified through harassment of
black maintenance workers. Ransby, The Politics of Exclusion: Black Students Fight
Back, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 1988, at 412.
4. THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY ON DISCRIMINATION AND DISCRIMINA-
TORY HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT (1988) [hereinafter
MICHIGAN POLICY].
5. Under the Michigan policy, the possible sanctions for the proscribed misconduct
are: (1) formal reprimand; (2) community service; (3) attendance in a class "that helps the
person understand the situation of the group against which the remarks or behavior were
directed;" (4) restitution of damaged property; (5) removal from University Housing; (6)
suspension from specific courses or activities; (7) suspension; and (8) expulsion. Id. at § D.
6. Id. at § B. The Michigan policy indicates that
[t]he following types of behavior are discrimination or discriminatory harass-
ment and are subject to discipline if they occur in educational or academic
centers:
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an indi-
vidual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, na-
tional origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran sta-
tus, and that:
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1989-90] RACIAL SPEECH ON CAMPUS 735
Racism on campus has become a nationwide problem.7 A sur-
vey of three hundred students from twenty universities reveals
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic efforts,
employment, participation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an
individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University sponsored
extracurricular activities or personal safety; or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for educa-
tional pursuits, employment or participation in University sponsored extracurric-
ular activities.
Id. § B, at no. 1.
While many different groups are victimized, the analysis in this Note will focus on
stigmatization based on race because most campus incidents of such victimization are
aimed at blacks. Berger, Deep Racial Divisions Persist in New Generation at College,
N.Y. Times, May 22, 1989, § A, at 15, col. 1.
7. The following examples represent the types of racial incidents occurring on college
campuses across the country:
(1) "At Arizona State University, 500 white students seething over an assault on a
white student by three black students shouted anti-black slurs." Berger, supra note 6, § A,
at 1, col. 1.
(2) In the fall of 1988, the Zeta Beta Tau fraternity at the University of Wisconsin's
Madison campus "held a mock slave auction at which some pledges performed skits in
blackface." Worthington, University of Wisconsin Regents Move to Rein in Racism, The
Chicago Tribune, Apr. 12, 1989, § C, at 1. Zeta Beta Tau (ZBT), a primarily Jewish
fraternity, was itself a target of racism when Fiji (another fraternity) members crashed a
ZBT party, beat three people and taunted them with anti-semitic slurs. Weiner, supra note
3, at 260. In 1986 the Kappa Sigma fraternity had a party featuring a "'Harlem Room,'
with white students in blackface, watermelon punch, graffiti on the walls and garbage on
the floor." Id.
(3) "[O]n the first day of class at the University of Maryland in College Park, a black
female student complained to the administration that her white male professor told her she
had two strikes against her if she wanted to be an engineer - her sex and her race."
Innerst, Colleges Torn by Racial Violence, The Wash. Times, October 26, 1989, § A, at 1.
Other incidents at the University of Maryland include, "the shunning of a Korean student
by her classmates, a swastika painted on the wall outside a center for Jewish students, a
Ku Klux Klan request for time on campus radio, and fliers distributed for an organiza-
tional meeting of a White Student Union." Id.
(4) At Louisiana State University, a fight broke out when black students entered a
"black face" party thrown by a white fraternity. Id.
(5) At San Francisco City College, "[t]wo posters outside the Black Student Union
[were] defaced with swastikas and racial slurs." Id.
(6) At New York University, "[a] laundry ticket was tacked to the bulletin board of
an Asian student group. A poster of the Rev. Jesse Jackson was ripped from the door of a
dormitory room occupied by a Hispanic woman. When she put it back up, someone set it
on fire." Lee, Law Students at N.Y.U. Rally Against Race Bias, N.Y. Times, March 3,
1989, § B, at 2, col. 5.
(7) At Loyola Marymount University, a black freshman "said she had been stopped at
least three times since September by security guards and asked what she was doing on
campus." Goodman, Students Charge Bias Abounds at Loyola and Say It's Tolerated at
Top, L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1989, § J, at 1, col. 5.
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that race relations are "by far the most frequently mentioned con-
cern" of university students.8 At Michigan State University, "two
thirds of the 136 students who were asked whether they had seen
an incident on campus 'that [they] thought was racist or showed
an intolerance for minorities,' said yes." 9
While racial harassment increases, the percentage of blacks
enrolled in universities is decreasing.10 To counteract these trends
several universities have enacted anti-discrimination policies which
provide stiff penalties for those who engage in racist expression.11
8. What Students Think: Racism is a Big Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989, § 1, at
43, col. 1.
9. Michigan News Briefs, Proprietary to the United Press Int'l 1989, March 21,
1989.
10. See, e.g., Rezendes, Campus Minorities: Confronting Racism With Mature
Methods, The Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 1988, § A, at 3, col. 1 (Between 1983 and 1988, the
"black college enrollment . . . increased numerically, but dropped from 9.6 percent of the
student population to about 8.8 percent.").
11. Besides the University of Michigan's anti-discrimination policy, see supra notes
4-6 and accompanying text, at the University of Massachusetts, students successfully de-
manded that "tougher prohibitions against racial harassment" be added to the student con-
duct code. Rezendes, supra note 10, § A, at 3, col. 1. In June of 1989, the University of
Massachusetts enacted a prohibition against "'racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic, cultural, and
religious intolerance' on their 27 campuses." Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression
In a Sea of Freedom", COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17.
The State University of New York School of Law in Buffalo "issued a statement from
the faculty warning that sanctions will be imposed for 'racist, sexist, homophobic and anti-
lesbian, ageist, and ethnically derogatory statements' that indicate the student lacks 'suffi-
cient moral character to be admitted to the practice of law.'" Matsuda, supra note 1, at
2370 n.248 (citing Faculty Statement Regarding Intellectual Freedom, Tolerance, and Pro-
hibited Harassment, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law (Oct. 3,
1987)).
During the summer of 1989, the University of Wisconsin revised the student code so
that "'certain types of expressive behavior directed at individuals and intended to demean
and to create a hostile environment for education or other university-authorized activities
would be prohibited and made subject to disciplinary sanctions.'" Finn, supra, at 17. The
Wisconsin policy "provides a range of penalties, including expulsion for a student found
guilty of using words that demean another student, a campus visitor or an employee on the
basis of race, religion, national origin, sex disability or sexual orientation. It also would
address such group behavior as racially demeaning fraternity skits." Worthington, supra
note 7, § C, at 1, col. 2. The regents voted to remove the phrase "epithets shall be pre-
sumed to have been uttered with the required intent" so that the burden of proof would be
on the accuser. Id. § C, at 2, col. 1.
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has also tightened anti-discrimina-
tion restrictions by adopting an anti-discrimination policy similar to those adopted by the
University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin. See Finn, supra, at 17.
Among the private colleges that have recently enacted anti-discrimination policies are
Emory, Smith and Stanford. See Mitgang, When Right Goes Wrong; Faced with Racial
Tension, Colleges Debate How Free Student Speech Should Be, L.A. Times, June 11,
1989, § 1, at 2, col. 1; see Berger, supra note 6, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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Some legal scholars argue that university anti-discrimination poli-
cies violate first amendment rights.' 2 Both conservatives and civil
libertarians warn that these policies are so broad that they will
punish speech deserving first amendment protection. Further, sti-
fling all racist speech on campus may increase racial tension since
only open discussions allow people to express their views and ex-
change ideas about racist attitudes. These arguments led a federal
district court to permanently enjoin the University of Michigan
from enforcing its policy against verbal behavior or conduct. 3 In
the wake of the Michigan decision, this Note will explore the pos-
sibilities of designing a university policy that punishes racial epi-
thets but preserves the right to openly discuss racial issues.
The discussion will focus on whether university anti-discrimi-
nation policies represent a valid exercise of university authority or
thwart the first amendment guarantee of free expression. Central
to this question is the tension between the constitutional necessity
of protecting unpopular speech and the desire to control the dam-
age that racist expression inflicts on the university community. Al-
though racial tensions pervade private as well as public universi-
ties, private institutions have far more regulatory freedom; 4
therefore this Note will focus on public universities.
The constitutional validity of targeting racist epithets will ul-
timately depend on how the courts classify the university policies
in terms of first amendment jurisprudence. This Note will con-
sider three analytical perspectives through which courts may view
regulations of racist speech on college campuses. First, a content-
based analysis will be discussed to determine whether first amend-
ment protection of racist speech advances the underlying philoso-
phies of free expression.' 5 Second, prevention of group defamation
will be considered as a possible justification for the university poli-
cies.' 6 Third, the analysis will address how the special environ-
ment of the university alters the application of first amendment
12. See, e.g., Finn supra note 11, at 19 (noting the chilling effect that may result
from certain university solutions).
13. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding
that the university's policy was overbroad and so vague that its enforcement would violate
the due process clause).
14. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2370 (public institutions are bound by the first
amendment under the state action doctrine while private institutions are not).
15. See infra notes 19-73 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 74-162 and accompanying text.
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principles.1 7 Finally, this Note proposes a Model University Anti-
Racism Policy which is tailored to regulate the most invidious ra-
cist epithets while assuring that the right to discuss racial issues is
granted full first amendment protection.'
I. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS OF RACIST SPEECH
Some theorists suggest that racist speech is so antithetical to
the constitutional values of modern America that it should not be
afforded first amendment protection.' Proponents of this view
often turn to a content-based analysis20 in order to carve racist
remarks out of the realm of speech that is given full first amend-
ment protection. By placing racist speech low in the hierarchy of
protected speech, states would be permitted to exercise regulatory
power over racist epithets, and state universities would be free to
maintain their anti-discrimination policies.
Content-based restrictions are designed to "limit communica-
tion because of the message conveyed."'" The Court has identified
certain inherently harmful categories of expression which are set
outside the constitutionally protected realm and classified as non-
speech. Examples of such content-based exceptions are "'fighting'
words,"22 "incitement to riot,' 23 and obscenity. 4 Some jurists ad-
17. See infra notes 163-215 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
19. See Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech: When Big Brother Should Butt In,
23 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 96 (1984) (pointing out that obscenity laws support the assertion that
speech can be restricted on the basis of content); see also Arkes, Civility and the Restric-
tion of Speech: Rediscovering the Defamation of Groups, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 281
(supporting limited group libel laws).
20. Content-based analysis involves an inquiry first into whether the expression fur-
thers underlying first amendment rationales and second into balancing the reasons for and
against protection. See Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 194-95 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation]. An alternative
form of analysis preferred by Professor Schauer is categorization. Categorization serves the
same purpose of defining certain categories of speech out of the general realm of protec-
tion. The difference between the two analytical frameworks is that categorization allows for
less judicial discretion than content-based analysis by establishing rules for the treatment
of subcategories. Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 300 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories] (pointing out that with
categorization the judge merely has to "place the case in the proper category in order to
determine the result").
21. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 20, at 190.
22. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "fighting"
words as expressions "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace").
Stanford University's anti-discrimination policy is based on the fighting words distinc-
[Vol. 40:733
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vocate such an exception for speech that defames a group defined
by a common national origin. 5
In a content-based analysis, the court assesses the value of an
expression by focusing "on the extent to which the speech furthers
the historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie
the first amendment. 26 If the expression is deemed to be of such
low value that it merits only limited constitutional protection, the
court will place this genre of speech among the other categories
that are unprotected.2 7 Then the court would define what circum-
stances merit restriction.28 To determine the validity of a content-
based restriction for racial expression, the freedom to engage in
racist speech will be examined for whether it furthers the search
for truth 2 9 self-government,30 and self-actualization3 1 philosophies
underlying the first amendment.
A. The Search for Truth
One justification for giving wide deference to free expression
tion. Under the Stanford model, "a student would violate the university's disciplinary code
by directly and intentionally using the equivalent of 'fighting words' to insult another per-
son on the basis of characteristics enumerated in the university's nondiscrimination policy.
Fighting words in this context are defined as words or other symbols 'commonly understood
to convey, in a direct and visceral way, hatred or contempt' for people subject to pervasive
discrimination on the basis of their personal characteristics." Stanford Seeks Only to Curb
Insulting Epithets, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1989, § A, at 26, col. 4.
The problem with the Stanford approach is that many epithets are expressed through
banners, leaflets, or the defacement of signs. These situations would not fall under the
fighting words exception since there is no direct confrontation which may lead to an imme-
diate breach of peace. See Edelman, Punishing Perpetrators of Racist Speech, Legal
Times of Wash., May 15, 1989, at 20, col. 1.
23. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (The Court held that police had
the power to prevent a breach of the peace when "the speaker passes bounds of argument
of persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.").
24. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32-34 (1973) (permitting a community stan-
dard to define the outward borders of obscenity).
25. "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication
of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940). Even some who recognize that some benefit can be derived from
abusive language assert that this benefit is outweighed by compelling state interest. See
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (the Court held that "any benefit [from the fighting words]
...is clearly outweighed by social interest in order and morality").
26. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 20, at 194.
27. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscenity as
unprotected speech).
28. See Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 20, at 194-95.
29. See infra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
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is that open public discussion advances the search for truth. At
first glance, protection of racist expression appears directly to
thwart this underlying first amendment rationale. Because equal-
ity is a centerpiece of the American conception of a participatory
democracy, 32 speech that promotes inequality based on race does
not contribute to an understanding of our society any more than
the argument that the world is flat. Dean Lee Bollinger, who ulti-
mately concludes that racist speech should be tolerated, concedes
that tolerating such expression is antithetical to the search for
truth.3 3 Dean Bollinger explains that "[t]he more we believe in
the immorality or error of the ideas being expressed . . . the more
attenuated is the truth-seeking advantage claimed as the justifica-
tion for the free speech principle. The 'value' to us in these terms
ranges from remote to none."3" Consequently, the search for truth
rationale is seldom if ever argued in cases involving racist
expression. 5
Although the Supreme Court has never denied first amend-
ment protection to irrational speech, only rational debate can be
justified by a truth-seeking philosophy. 6 Racist speech may be
32. Professor Tribe explains that:
[T]he ideal of equality expresses aspirations so basic as to demand major atten-
tion on its own terms. Indeed, the notion that equal justice under law may serve
as indirect guardian of virtually all constitutional values is evidenced by more
than a maxim carved in marble on the United States Supreme Court. That no-
tion, expressed with growing frequency and even stridency throughout this cen-
tury, wars with the idea that equality is liberty's great enemy and can be pur-
chased only at an unacceptable price to freedom.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-1, at 1436 (2d ed. 1988).
33. See L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREE SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 54 (1986). Dean Bollinger's theory is that the act of tolerating racist
speech has symbolic value in itself, and that this tolerance will bring greater good to soci-
ety than restricting extremist speech. Bollinger sees tolerance as a "matter of self-protec-
tive political strategy, a response to a perceived reality of ever-threatening intolerance and
prejudice." Id. at 99. Bollinger concludes that "we must not fail to see the genuine nobility
of a society that can count among its strengths a consciousness of its own weaknesses." Id.
at 248.
In contrast, Professor Mari Matsuda rejects Dean Bollinger's tolerance theory by as-
serting that "[tlolerance of hate speech is not tolerance borne by the community at large.
Rather, it is a psychic tax imposed on those least able to pay." Matsuda, supra note 1, at
2323.
34. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 54.
35. Id.
36. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court explained:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor
[Vol. 40:733
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considered irrational because such criticism assumes that "unde-
sirable voluntary behavior" is a function of an immutable charac-
teristic.3 7 The faulty logic in this correlation is that while the vol-
untary behavior is the true object of the criticism, no voluntary
action on the part of the victim can eliminate the negative associa-
tion that prejudice conjures up from the victim's inherited quali-
ties. If rational discourse is a necessary means of understanding
and refining society, irrational speech cannot be defended as a
way to approach this understanding. Because racist speech pro-
motes irrational stereotyping, it adds nothing to public discourse
that directly advances the search for truth. Accordingly, protect-
ing racist speech violates the fundamental truth-seeking philoso-
phy of the first amendment since, as Justice Brandeis wrote, it "is
the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears." 8
However, even if racist expression rings categorically false
and irrational, there remain reasons why such speech may further
the pursuit of truth. For centuries, it has been argued that con-
fronting the choice between truth and falsity makes people know
and appreciate true ideas. John Milton wrote that "books are as
meats and viands are - some of good, some of evil substance,"
and "bad meats will scarce breed good nourishment in the healthi-
est concoction; but herein the difference is of bad books, that they
to a discreet and judicious reader serve in many respects to dis-
cover, to confute, to forewarn, and to illustrate."3 9 John Stuart
Mill argued that through censorship society loses "what is almost
as great a benefit [as truth], the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error."4 Per-
the careless error materially advances society's interest in "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate on public issues. They belong to that category of utter-
ances which "are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
418 U.S. 232, 339-40 (1974) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
37. Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1976) (discussing frustrations caused by generalizations based on the immuta-
ble characteristics of race).
38. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"Brandeis recognized the importance of self-control and that it brings benefits not just to
those who have been spared as victims but also to those who have been spared the costs of
acting badly towards them." L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 141.
39. J. MILTON, Areopagitica, in JOHN MILTON, COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR
PROSE 727 (M. Hughes ed. 1957).
40. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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haps the most famous articulation, of this philosophy is the mar-
ketplace metaphor coined by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United
States.1 Justice Holmes wrote that "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market. 42
It is important to note the adversarial quality of this model.
The mere existence of falsity does not illuminate truth. The only
way a false idea can advance the search for truth is through its
juxtaposition to a truthful complement. To the extent that a false
idea invites refutation, the idea is valuable for it encourages a
higher understanding of the truth. Viewed in this perspective, the
presence of racist speech appears important as a catalyst for de-
bate on the issue. For only the articulation of racist ideas leads to
strong arguments against the merits of racist ideology.43
The adversarial model of the search for truth rationale pro-
vides a sound analytical framework for judging when racist speech
is beneficial enough to merit first amendment protection. Many
university anti-discrimination policies are vague. For example,
Michigan's policy targets racist threats. While the leaflet and ra-
dio incidents 4 clearly fall into the category of racist threats, it is
possible that a psychology dissertation on success as a function of
race or a criticism of affirmative action policies would also be pun-
ishable as civilized masks for pure racial aggression. The adver-
sarial quality of the search for truth model provides a useful struc-
ture for defining the difference between these two sets of
examples. The academic discussion and the informal criticism of
affirmative action are ideas that invite responses, and therefore,
further the search for truth. Conversely, the leaflet and radio jokes
can be distinguished because they do not invite a response.
41. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (The Court upheld the convictions of five Russians for vio-
lation of the Espionage Act indicating that a publication intended to incite contempt and
resistance against the United States government during the time of war is not protected by
the first amendment.)
42. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. However, truth may never be as seductive as good propaganda. See Kretzmer,
Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 469-70 (1987). Professor
Kretzmer argues that since racist ideas are often highly attractive to the public, these views
handicap the search for truth in the short run. Kretzmer points out that racist ideas are
often invoked by governments and publicly accepted during times of social or economic
upheaval. Id. To Kretzmer, the historical repetition of this tactic undermines the validity of
the marketplace metaphor, although false ideas may eventually be rejected over a period of
time. Id.
44. See supra notes 2-3 and text accompanying note 2.
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This first set of examples stands isolated as racial epithets -
phrases intended to fix an association between a group and a dis-
paraging idea without inviting a response. When such incidents
occur, criticism emerges in the media and among members of the
community. These responses, however, are inadequate because the
reaction is limited to sympathetic circles and is not a communica-
tion between the original speakers, who may have been anony-
mous, and their target. The Supreme Court of the United States
has recognized that this type of imbalance thwarts the search for
truth.45
At this point, a distinction can be drawn between racial ideas
and racist epithets. A racial idea invites debate and advances the
search for truth. Racist epithets, however, are more properly clas-
sified as isolated insults. In so far as a racial idea advances this
underlying first amendment rationale, the idea merits protection.
However, protection of racist epithets undermines the purposes of
the truth-seeking goal underlying the first amendment.
B. The Self-Government Rationale
Professor Alexander Meiklejohn illustrated the importance of
'the self-government rationale to the American experience through
an image of the town meeting.46 Professor Meiklejohn explains
that this principle of free speech is "not a Law of Nature or of
Reason in the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suf-
frage." 47 The rationale of universal participation is premised on
the notion that "[t]o be afraid of ideas, any idea, is to be unfit for
self-government." '48
Questioning the legitimacy of protecting racist speech illumi-
nates an inherent conflict in Meiklejohn's rationale. His philoso-
phy of equal participation would not be furthered by speech that
45. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
an FCC order to allow a party equal radio air time to rebut a personal attack by the
station). In Red Lion, the Court used the marketplace metaphor to show how the truth-
seeking ethic suffers when radio stations broadcast disparaging remarks from one side of an
issue without giving the opposition an opportunity to respond. Id. at 390.
46. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-27
(1948) [hereinafter A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (examining the effect of the First
Amendment on the procedure of the traditional American town meeting).
47. Id. at 26-27.
48. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 28 (1960) [hereinafter A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM].
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encourages racially-biased exclusion or by speech that excludes
the unorthodox speaker. This conflict turns the issue into a balanc-
ing question of whether suppressing the first amendment rights of
one individual is justified when this person advocates harm to or
exclusion of other members of the community. Since Meiklejohn's
model is based on "a voluntary compact among political equals," '49
excluding some members of the community would result in an ine-
quality of citizens which would be inconsistent with the model.
Similarly, Professor Karst asserts that, "[i]nsofar as a guarantee
of free speech rests on a theory of self-government, then, the prin-
ciple of equal liberty of expression is inherent in that guaran-
tee."'50 However, by promoting alienation,5' racist epithets move
the community in a direction that is inconsistent with the self-
government justification for free expression in a participatory
democracy.
49. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 46, at 11 (discussing the idea that a
duty to obey a law arises only if a person has equally shared in making it).
50. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHi. L.
REv. 20, 25 (1975). Professor Karst criticizes Professor Meiklejohn's application of the
model to the parliamentary setting. Specifically, he criticizes the assertion that equality of
ideas does not necessitate all voices being heard, as long as each idea has a representative
voice. Professor Meiklejohn explains:
The First Amendment . . . is not the guardian of unregulated talkativeness.
It does not require that, on every occasion, every citizen shall take part in public
debate. Nor can it even give assurance that everyone shall have opportunity to
do so. If, for example, at a town meeting, twenty like-minded citizens have be-
come a "party," and if one of them has read to the meeting an argument which
they have all approved, it would be ludicrously out of order for each of the
others to insist on reading it again. No competent moderator would tolerate that
wasting of the time available for free discussion. What is essential is not that
everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.
A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 46, at 25. Professor Karst criticizes this passage
for undermining the principle of equality inherent in the model:
Meiklejohn's rather strained example does not even typify the expression in town
meetings, let alone the sort of freewheeling expression characteristic of debate in
the public forum. But Meiklejohn is wrong in a more fundamental way. The
state lacks "moderators" who can be trusted to know when "everything worth
saying" has been said, and the legislature lacks the capacity to write laws that
will tell a moderator when to make such a ruling. And even the repetition of
speech conveys the distinctive message that an opinion is widely shared. The
impression of a mounting consensus is of great importance in an "other-di-
rected" society where opinion polls are self-fulfilling prophecies. A vital public
forum requires a principle of equal liberty of expression that is broad, protecting
speakers as well as ideas.
Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
51. For a discussion of the nature and gravity of the psychological harm inflicted
through racial incidents, see infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text.
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In a university setting, the issue becomes whether the first
amendment guarantee of free expression outweighs the univer-
sity's authority to deter and reprimand a student who seeks to ex-
tinguish the participatory rights of other students. Here again, dif-
ferent forms of racist speech divide according to whether they
invite a response. Racist speech that encourages a response does
not infringe on the participatory rights of other community mem-
bers and therefore, according to the self-government rationale,
should be left unregulated. Racist epithets, however, fall on the
other side of this line, not only because of their exclusive form,
but because they are specifically and solely intended to alienate
minorities.
An event from the Fall of 1988 illustrates this exclusionary
effect. On the Berkeley campus of the University of California,
black students requested that the school radio station play a re-
cording of rap music.52 Over the air, the student disc jockey re-
sponded by telling the black students to "[g]o back to Oakland." 3
When reports of this sort of incident reverberate throughout the
campus, the epithet sends a message to all black students that if
they attempt to have a voice in a campus organization, they will
be treated with hostility.
While first amendment rights are considered among those
meriting the greatest judicial protection, freedom of expression
cannot be treated as though it exists in a vacuum. The value in
protecting the racist speaker can only be assessed when it is held
up against its potential for limiting the constitutional rights of
others.5 4 In view of the self-government rationale, the balance in-
52. Rap is a popular form of music associated with black culture. See Goldstein, Pop
Eye: A Rappin' Big Year for Little Jive Records, L.A. Times, June 19, 1988, at 90, col. 4;
Hillburn, Rap - The Power and the Controversy, L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, at 78, col. 4.
53. Fernandez, Racism Lives on in Colleges, San Fran. Examiner, Nov. 13, 1988,
back page, col. 2. Oakland is a predominately black community situated between San
Francisco and Berkeley. THE WORLD ALMANAC 1990 558 (1989) (based on 1980 census
figures).
54. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 302 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("We
should weigh the value of insulting speech against its potentiality for harm."). But see First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) where the Court declared, "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order
to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." Id. at
790-91 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)). For a criticism of this dicta,
see Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986). Professor Fiss
asserts that:
The received Tradition takes no account of the fact that to serve the ultimate
purpose of the first amendment we may sometimes find it necessary to "restrict
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dicates that curbing the racist speaker tampers less with our no-
tion of ordered liberty than permitting substantial sectors of the
community to be alienated from public discourse. For when some
voices are allowed such deference that they effectively silence
other voices, political equality disappears, the marketplace is no
longer free, and both the self-government and search for truth ra-
tionales are undermined.
C. The Self-Actualization Rationale
Proponents of the self-actualization rationale view freedom of
speech as a right of individual expression. In a democratic order,
freedom of speech functions as a necessary catalyst to self-deter-
mination.55 This theory of self-realization breaks down into the
twin rights of controlling personal destiny through decision-mak-
ing and developing intellectual powers and abilities.56 The first
right is a broader version of the self-government rationale, for it
focuses on an individual's right to give and receive information
that is necessary to making important life decisions.57 Professor
Redish describes the second as the right to develop personal
human faculties through art, literature, dance or whatever other
method one chooses.58
This extension of the theory has troubled writers such as
Judge (then Professor) Bork who claim that the self-actualization
rationale is theoretically flawed since the doctrine fails to distin-
the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others," and that unless the Court allows, and sometimes even requires, the
state to do so, we as a people will never truly be free.
Id. at 1425.
55. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3
(1967) [hereinafter T. EMERSON, GENERAL THEORY] (free speech assures "individual self-
fulfillment").
56. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 11 (1984) (arguing that "individual
self-realization" is the fundamental rationale behind the First Amendment); see also T.
EMERSON, GENERAL THEORY, supra note 55, at 4-5 ("The right to freedom of expression
• ..[derives first from the idea] that the proper end of man is the realization of his char-
acter and potentialities as a human being [and] secondly from . . . the role of the individ-
ual in his capacity as a member of society.").
57. Although the participatory argument in this context closely resembles the self-
government rationale, Professor Redish has expanded it to include the right to receive com-
mercial information. See M. REDISH, supra note 56, at 57, 60-68 (noting that self-realiza-
tion encompasses a wide range of activities).
58. See id. at 57 (noting that the self-realization rationale of developing human fac-
ulties is an important end in itself).
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guish speech from other self-serving conduct.5 9  According to
Judge Bork,
[a]n individual may develop his faculties or derive pleasure from
trading on the stock market, following his profession as a river
port pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity,
playing tennis, rigging prices or in any of thousands of endeav-
ors. . . .These functions or benefits of speech are. . . indistin-
guishable from the functions or benefits of all other human
activity.6"
One response to Judge Bork can be found in the writings of
Thomas Emerson, who wrote that the self-actualization "theory
rests upon a fundamental distinction between . . 'expression'
and 'action'" and that "society must withhold its right of suppres-
sion until the stage of action is reached.""' More importantly,
speech is expressly differentiated from other expressive conduct by
the existence of the first amendment which serves as a constitu-
tional mandate to protect this freedom.6 2 No similar provision ex-
ists which would apply to a more general liberty for all expressive
action.
Proponents of the self-actualization theory believe that people
with unpopular views have as much of a right to expressive self-
fulfillment as mainstream thinkers. However, those believing that
racist remarks deserve some first amendment protection based on
the self-actualization principle do not necessarily oppose the kind
of balancing that takes into account the damaging effects of such
speech. As Professor Redish explains, "the self-realization value
does not preclude balancing the interest of free speech against
competing social values. Under a balancing concept, we could ac-
59. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that the self-actualization theory standing alone would re-
quire the constitutional privileging of many types of behavior in addition to speech).
60. Id. at 25.
61. T. EMERSON. GENERAL THEORY, supra note 55, at 6-7.
62. Professor Schauer asserts that it is
freedom of speech and press, and not freedom of liberty in general, that is spe-
cifically set forth in the text for special protection. Even if the justification
would, to be fully consistent, have to be applied to a far wider range of cases,
only part of this range is picked out by the constitutional text for special atten-
tion. The reason we do not apply the self-development arguments to their full
reach is that we lack the constitutional mandate for so doing. Because we have
that mandate in the case of speech, we can proceed to apply that justification in
speech cases. The relevant distinction under this argument - what makes
speech special - is the very fact that the constitutional text says it is.
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1284, 1297-98 (1983).
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
cept . . . the equal value of different types of speech, yet still de-
cide that the different areas of expression may be treated differ-
ently because of external considerations.""3
To analyze racist expression through this self-actualization
theory, one must decide whether racist epithets are pure insults or
self-fulfilling expressions that advance the twin rights of self-de-
termination and self-development. Those who consider racist
speech to be insulting acts believe that "a racial insult is only in
small part an expression of self: it is primarily an attempt to in-
jure through the use of words."64 This view assumes that though
all speech has some self-actualization value, some forms of speech
should be regulated for they are articulated more to inflict harm
than to express a belief. Professor Tribe asserts that "[t]he first
amendment need not sanctify the deliberate infliction of pain sim-
ply because the vehicle used is verbal or symbolic rather than
physical. And legislatures may create remedies for the damage
done with words so long as these remedies display sufficient sensi-
tivity to freedom of expression as well."6 5
Seen in this light, the line between an insult and a politically
abhorrent idea appears brighter. Concrete examples of this dis-
tinction can be seen in the difference between Picasso's graphic
criticism of women and a pornographic publication or between an
academic discussion of racial differences and the Michigan leaflet.
Courts draw these kinds of lines regularly.66 Those who classify
racist speech as insulting acts can argue within this analytical
framework that the self-fulfilling value of speech is not an abso-
lute and must be limited to the degree that such speech causes
tangible harm to others.6 7
63. M. REDISH, supra note 56, at 81.
64. Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 176 (1982) (footnote omitted).
65. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 856.
66. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1951) (drawing a line
between an academic discussion of law violation and advocacy of law violation). Similarly,
Professor Lasson asserts that differentiating between "racial defamation and political com-
ment is not nearly as difficult" as drawing this line in the obscenity context. Lasson, Racial
Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
11, 48 (1985) [hereinafter Lasson, Racial Defamation].
67. See Delgado, supra note 64, at 156 (arguing that the self-fulfillment rationale
must be overshadowed when excessive acts cause harm to others).
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D. Applying Content-Based Restrictions to Racist Speech
Although the traditional first amendment rationales provide
cogent reasons why racist speech should not be protected, regula-
tion of racist speech would be a content-based restriction which by
definition carries a heavy presumption of invalidity. Commenta-
tors have noted that the Court has become "especially wary" of
content-based restrictions,"8 and the Court has insisted that
"above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."69 University anti-discrimination
policies will be considered valid only if the speech they sanction is
deemed to be of low value. "[Flor except when low value speech is
at issue, the Court has invalidated almost every content-based re-
striction that it has considered in the past quarter-century."7 0
The presumption against content-based restrictions follows
from the idea that they promote inequality. Professor Karst as-
serts that equality "lies at the heart of the first amendment's pro-
tections against government regulation of the content of speech." 7'
When one side of an issue is silenced, the other sides clearly have
a competitive advantage. "When government restricts only certain
ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, people wishing to ex-
press the restricted messages receive 'unequal' treatment. ' 72 The
Court clearly disapproves of discriminatory treatment of speech,
because
under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum
to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views
... . There is an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,' and
government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity
to be heard.73
While the logic of these arguments works toward the protec-
tion of most extremist speech in order to preserve first amendment
68. See, e.g., Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case
of Subject-Matter Restrictions. 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 82 (1978) (noting that the court
has upheld content-based restrictions only in "extraordinary circumstances").
69. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (citations omitted).
70. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 20, at 196 (footnote omitted).
71. Karst, supra note 50, at 21.
72. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 20, at 202.
73. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96 (footnote omitted) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM, supra note 48, at 27).
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equality, the exclusionary quality of racist speech changes the an-
alytical considerations. Since the racist speech itself serves to si-
lence other voices, it is only through suppressing this speech that
true equality is achieved. Although convincing first amendment
arguments can be found for protecting racist speech, the balance
of the arguments shows that non-protection will more appropri-
ately further the traditional philosophies underlying free expres-
sion. Therefore, classifying racist speech within the low value
realm that may be regulated remains a legitimate alternative.
II. EFFORTS TO RESTRICT RACIST SPEECH REOPEN THE
QUESTION OF WHERE THE COURT STANDS ON GROUP LIBEL
STATUTES
When universities seek to promote racial tolerance through
anti-discrimination policies that punish racist speech, the adminis-
trators are asking the courts to permit a content-based restriction
analogous to a group libel statute. These laws that prohibit racial
abuse are designed to promote order by minimizing racial ten-
sions. 74 In justifying the regulation of speech that inspires hatred
for a racial, ethnic, or religious group, universities inevitably will
confront whether group libel statutes are still a sound basis for
state regulation.
The only time the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional
validity of a group libel statute was in the 1952 decision of Beau-
harnais v. Illinois.7 15 The Beauharnais Court, by a five to four
vote, affirmed the conviction of a white supremacist under a law
prohibiting publications that defamed groups on the basis of race
or religion. 6 In effect, the majority decision upheld the validity of
74. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 391-92 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter T. EMERSON, SYSTEM OF FREEDOM]. Thomas Emerson explains that:
Group libel laws are designed to promote internal order by eliminating or reduc-
ing friction among racial, religious, national or similar groups. In general they
seek to prohibit, through criminal or civil process, communications that are abu-
sive, offensive, or derogatory with respect to a group, or that tend to arouse
public contempt, prejudice, or hatred toward the group.
Id.
75. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
76. Id. at 267. The Illinois statute authorized criminal penalties for any public exhi-
bition of a publication which "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue
of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which . . . exposes the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy .... " Id. at 251 (quot-
ing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 471 (1949) (repealed 1961)). This Illinois statute is typical of
other group libel statutes that were promulgated after World War II. The statute was later
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group libel statutes. In doing so, the Court recognized that states
have the authority to minimize the harmful results of speech that
defames a specific group."7 The Court noted that in light of Illi-
nois' history of racial discord, the legislature had a legitimate in-
terest in maintaining "the peace and well-being of the State.
78
Justice Black dissented, claiming group libel is merely a "sugar-
coating"79 on blatant censorship. Justice Black was convinced that
the decision was a direct assault on the first amendment and noth-
ing more than a pyrrhic victory for minorities.8 0 He concluded his
dissent by cautioning those encouraged by the Court's decision to
heed the warning of the "ancient remark: 'Another such victory
and I am undone.' "81
Despite the inconclusive appearance of the five-to-four split,
the Beauharnais decision established a presumption that group li-
bel statutes are valid. Eight of the nine Justices expressly assented
that if narrowly written and appropriately applied, state legisla-
tion may regulate speech that defames a group."2 Justice Black's
passionate dissent on this point83 does not undermine the general
principle, established by the opinion, that certain forms of libel
are of such low value that regulation should be permitted.84 The
theoretical basis of his dissent is that the first amendment applies
to the states as originally written in absolute terms, and therefore,
repealed, although apparently not because of any weakness in the legislation itself. Arkes,
supra note 19, at 287.
77. See Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
78. id.
79. Id. at 271 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 269 (Black, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 275 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion upholding the Illinois statue. Id.
at 251. Justices Vinson, Burton, Clark and Minton joined in the majority opinion. Id. at
250. Justice Jackson dissented but agreed that "a state has power to bring classes 'of any
race, color, creed or religion' within the protection of its libel laws, if indeed traditional
forms do not already accomplish it." Id. at 299 (Jackson, J., dissenting). While Justice
Douglas adopted a nearly absolutist approach similar to Justice Black's, he noted that
there are extreme situations, where group libel may be punishable, namely when there is a
conspiracy to defame a group or when a clear and present danger exists. Id. at 284 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting). Justice Reed objected to the statute on vagueness grounds, but assumed
that states have the power "to pass group libel laws to protect the public peace." Id. at 283
(Reed, J., dissenting).
83. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
84. If Beauharnais' remarks had been addressed to a specific individual, then Justice
Black would have had little problem with the conviction because the speech would have
fallen under either the Chaplinsky "fighting words" exception or traditional criminal libel.
Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 271-73 (Black, J., dissenting).
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no legislature has the power to diminish a citizen's exercise of free
expression. This absolutist view has never been adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States."6 As first amendment juris-
prudence has evolved, the Court has continually maintained that
there are areas of expression of such low value -such as obscen-
ity - that can properly become objects of state regulation.87
Beauharnais stands for the principle that group libel belongs in
the realm of low-value speech where state regulation is justified.
A. New York Times v. Sullivan Altered the Underlying
Premises in Beauharnais
Although Beauharnais has never been overruled, many com-
mentators and courts believe that the concept of group libel is an
"anachronism. 88 As first amendment jurisprudence has evolved,
several of the underlying premises of the Beauharnais opinion
have been substantially altered. For example, to justify the wide
deference given to the Illinois legislature, the Court asserted that
no form of libel is in the realm of constitutionally protected
speech.89 The Court further assumed that if libel directed at an
individual was actionable, then a libelous utterance directed at a
defined group also should be actionablef 0 These blanket assump-
tions, that all libelous expression falls in the category of non-pro-
85. Id. at 270 (Black, J., dissenting). In a famous interview with Edmond Cahn,
Justice Black said, "I have no doubt ... that there should be no libel or defamation law
• . . just absolutely none .... " Cahn, Justice Hugo Black and the First Amendment
"Absolutes". A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 557 (1962).
86. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
925 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has allowed appropriate restraints on freedom
of speech).
87. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding "obscenity is
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
88. Arkes, supra note 19, at 284; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 82
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (arguing that Beauharnais is a "misfit" and should be
overruled); Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., concurring) (arguing that Beauharnais no longer reflects the view
of the Court's majority), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 390 (1969); United States v. Handler, 383
F. Supp. 1267, 1277-78 (D. Md. 1974) (questioning whether Beauharnais is still good
law); Bollinger, The Skoki Legacy: Reflections of an "Easy Case" and Free Speech The-
ory (Book Review), 80 MiCH. L. REv. 617, 620 (1982) ("Beauharnais was no longer good
law after Brandenburg v. Ohio .... "); Note, Group Vilification Reconsidered, 89 YALE
L.J. 308, 309 n.7 (1979) (noting widespread doubt as to Beauharnais' continued validity).
89. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 258 (1952). See T. EMERSON, SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM, supra note 74, at 396 (noting that Beauharnais "read the whole area of libel
law out of the First Amendment .... .
90. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258.
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tected speech, were rejected by the Supreme Court in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.91
The Court in New York Times broke significant new ground
in establishing that the protection against a regime of seditious
libel is "the central meaning of the First Amendment."92 The
common law crime of seditious libel referred to "words or writings
that do not amount to treason but are nonetheless critical of gov-
ernment officials or their policies." '93 The New York Times Court
reasoned that if criticism of the government is to be free and open,
some degree of protection must be available for criticism targeted
at public officials, even if such statements are defamatory and
false.94 This protection implicitly identified political speech as cen-
tral to the first amendment.9" As a result of New York Times,
public officials are permitted to collect damages for libelous criti-
cism but only when it is made with actual malice.96
This new protection for some libelous speech directly under-
mines the assumption in Beauharnais that all libelous speech falls
beyond the pale of first amendment protection. The identification
of political speech as a central first amendment concern also may
influence the way Beauharnais is viewed today. When Beauhar-
nais was decided, Justice Black argued that the first amendment
should preclude punishment for extremist speech that is presented
through a political petition.91 Now that the Court will permit first
amendment protection of some libelous speech and has focused on
political speech as a central value to be protected, Justice Black's
argument against this application of a group libel statute may
have more impact.
The question of whether racist expression is political speech
once again raises the issue of how form alters the first amendment
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. See id. at 273; see also L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33 (arguing that New York
Times made seditious libel unconstitutional); Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on 'the Central Meaning of the First Amendment', 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 209 (central
meaning of the first amendment "is that seditious libel cannot be made the subject of
government sanction").
93. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 12-12, at 861 (footnote omitted).
94. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271 (the inevitable erroneous statement must
be protected if free debate about public officials is to survive).
95. Id. at 266.
96. Id. at 279-80. Actual malice is defined by the Court as a statement made with
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.
at 280.
97. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 269 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
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analysis. As discussed earlier, modes of expression that invite re-
sponses are categorically different from epithets.98 The Beauhar-
nais majority did not address the issue of whether the leaflet was
designed primarily as a political petition or as a written assault.99
Beauharnais' leaflet urged the Chicago city government "to halt
the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white peo-
ple, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro
... . If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from
becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the ag-
gressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the
negro, SURELY WILL." 00 Although Justice Black believed that
presenting this inflammatory message in the form of a political
petition brought the leaflet within the free zone of the first amend-
ment, the rest of the Court may have responded differently.
Subsequent Supreme Court holdings though, have demon-
strated ongoing judicial approval of the Beauharnais holding. In
Garrison v. Louisiana,'0' the Court approved of the judicial appli-
cation of the Illinois group libel statute because it was "designed
to reach speech, such as group vilification, 'especially likely to lead
to public disorders.' "102 Almost two decades later in New York v.
Ferber'0 s the Court reaffirmed the treatment of Beauharnais' leaf-
let as low-value speech by citing Beauharnais to illustrate the le-
gitimacy of content-based regulation when "the evil to be re-
stricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
any, at stake."'10 4
While libelous statements that approach political speech may
be outside the low-value sphere, libelous remarks targeting private
individuals who are not public figures are still within the sphere of
permissible state regulation. 0 5 Unlike public figures, private indi-
98. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
99. Addressing the basic nature of the expression is the necessary point of analyti-
cal departure. The coupon contained in Beauharnais' leaflet, which offered membership in
the White Circle League, could have led the Court to classify the leaflet as a commercial
solicitation. See Arkes, supra note 19, at 304. Certainly the opinion would have been
stronger had it addressed the commercial and political aspects of the leaflet before declar-
ing that the primary nature of the publication was political.
100. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 276 (1951) (Appendix to Opinion of
Black, J., dissenting).
101. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
102. Id. at 70 (quoting Model Penal Code § 250.7 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961)).
103. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
104. Id. at 763-64.
105. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974) ("[s]tates
should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory
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viduals have limited access to "channels of effective communica-
tion" with the general public."0 6 Therefore, they have a greater
need for legal redress to countervail verbal assaults to their repu-
tation.10 7 Furthermore, private individuals are in greater need of
state protection because, unlike public figures, they have not as-
sumed the risk of involvement in public affairs and controver-
sies.108 This distinction between public and political libel as op-
posed to private libel may affect judicial treatment of group libel
statutes. The validity of a group libel statute may well depend on
the circumstances surrounding the specific statutory application.
Courts will be more likely to sustain a group libel statute in a
situation involving community members who defame fellow mem-
bers without political motive, as in the University scenario, rather
than a situation involving a political petition, as in Beauharnais.
Some commentators argue that applying the heightened New
York Times standard to group libel actions extends the New York
Times holding far beyond the scope intended by the Court.10 9 The
New York Times assertion that libel can no longer claim "talis-
manic immunity" from first amendment considerations" 0 did not
bring all libelous speech within the realm of free expression. This
assertion simply ensured "that a state could not remove speech
from judicial scrutiny merely by putting a label on it.""'
The expansion of first amendment protection to libel aimed at
public figures"I2 or concerning public issues"13 may have expanded
first amendment protection to include group libel among these
other protected categories of libelous speech. The public issues ex-
falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual").
106. Id. at 344.
107. Id. at 344-45.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 66, at 35 (arguing that New
York Times is "expressly limited to actions brought by public officials against critics of
their official conduct").
110. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269.
111. Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 66, at 35 (footnote omitted).
112. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974). In Gertz, a
reputable attorney representing the family of a police murder victim brought a libel action
against defendant magazine for publishing defamatory remarks about him and his associa-
tion with his client. The Court held that the attorney lacked the general fame and notoriety
to be a public figure under the New York Times test, so the defendant's speech was not
protected by the first amendment. Id.
113. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985)
(a credit agency's false report on a construction company's credit was not protected by the
first amendment because it was not a "matter[] of public concern.").
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ception raises the question of whether all racist speech should be
afforded first amendment protection by virtue of the fact that ra-
cial tension is a matter of great public concern. In deciding
whether libelous speech falls within the public issues exception,
the Court examines the expression's "content, form and con-
text.""' 4 For example, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders,"5 the Court concluded that the remarks in a disputed
credit report were not a matter of public concern because they
were made "solely in the individual interest of the speaker . . .
[and were] wholly false and clearly damaging to the victim's busi-
ness reputation.""" Applying this dicta to racist epithets furthers
the assertion that they should be considered low-value speech be-
cause they are expressed purely with an individual intent to injure.
Conversely, racist ideas expressed in forms that invite response are
not solely advanced in the speaker's interest at the victim's ex-
pense, but contribute to open public discourse. Racist ideas there-
fore may be legitimately classified as matters of public concern
according to the Dun & Bradstreet dicta.
Since the problem this Note addresses concerns college stu-
dents belonging to a racial minority, the public figures exception
does not aid the analysis except as an example of the Court's will-
ingness to expand first amendment protection of libelous speech
beyond the standard articulated in New York Times. Because the
Beauharnais decision placed group libel in the low-value speech
realm, in order to recognize first amendment protection of group
libel, the Court will need to decide that the harm from speech
which is libelous to a group is more like the damage resulting
from public libel than private libel."1
114. Id. at 761 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
115. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
116. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
117. Since 1699, courts have drawn a clear distinction between individual and group
libel, and they have failed to recognize a cause of action arising from disparaging words
directed at a group. Note, supra note 88, at 310. Although there is some authority that
utterances classified as group libel were crimes at common law, recovery of damages nor-
mally was permitted only in cases of individual libel. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258; See
Arkes, supra note 19, at 291 (arguing that it would be "absurd" to allow an individual to
recover personal damages for a disparaging comment directed generally at an entire
group). The theory behind the distinction "is that the gravamen of such an action must be
individual harm, and that as the target group increases in size, the harmful effect of the
statement on any individual member must be diluted, until at some point the harm falls
below the threshold of legal recognition." Note, supra note 88, at 310. Judicial adherence
to the common law has resulted in a customary denial that tangible harm results from
group defamation. But cf. Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel,
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Whether or not group libel results in the same type of injury
to reputation as individual libel is a question worth examining. If
it can be shown that group and individual libel result in the same
type of harm, the argument for regulating group libel becomes
stronger because individual libel is low-value speech that states
may regulate. The Beauharnais Court believed that both types of
libel could be equally damaging: "[T]he Illinois legislature may
warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportu-
nities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the
reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly
belongs, as on his own merits." 11 8 Throughout history, group defa-
mation has been used repeatedly as an instrument of political sup-
pression.11 9 "The well-known patterns of attacks on 'democrats',
42 COLuM. L. REv. 727 (1942) (criticizing judicial treatment of the increasing attacks on
groups and nationalities); Arkes, supra note 19, at 281 (discussing the inadequacy of treat-
ment of group libel).
118. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 263.
119. After World War II, several western European nations enacted group libel stat-
utes to guard against a recurrence of the extreme abuses that grew out of simple group
defamation and racism. See Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 66, at 50-53.
The aftermath of World War II revealed the catastrophic propositions of Nazi racism.
As a result, several international declarations were drafted in order to prevent similar
repercussions of racial hatred:
[A]rticle 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948 states: "All are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protec-
tion of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in
violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination."
Even more explicit is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1966. While article 19 of the Cove-
nant guarantees the right to freedom of expression, article 20 provides: "Any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law."
Precedence of antiracism over freedom of expression is carried even further
by the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, adopted in December, 1965. In article 4 of this Convention, which
has been ratified and acceded to by more than 100 states, the States Parties
"condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or the-
ories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin,
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form."
Kretzmer, supra note 43, at 447-48 (footnotes omitted).
The United States voted for adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and signed the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Racial Discrimination but these conventions have not been ratified . . . . [The
State Department] recommended that the United States should attach reserva-
tions to its ratification of these treaties.
Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted).
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'reds', 'socialists', 'Jews', 'liberals', 'Catholics', ran little risk of a
prosecution for libel, since vague groups of this sort, it was held,
could not be defamed."'120 Had the common law set a precedent
for recognition of the harm that resulted in group libel, some legal
remedy may have been available to those victimized by extreme
abuses of group defamation.
The enactment of group libel laws represents a political
choice to guard against repetition of past abuses. The Beauhar-
nais Court recognized the legitimacy of this motive by observing
that
Illinois did not have to look beyond her own borders or await the
tragic experience of the last three decades to conclude that wil-
ful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups
promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold ad-
justments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, poly-
glot community. 21
Allowing racist epithets to remain a form of group libel that states
may regulate creates a situation in which the expanded New York
Times standard prevails as practical security for open public dis-
course of racial ideas, while Beauharnais still stands, not for its
anachronistic generalizations, but for the principle that racist epi-
thets do cause harm to their victims and diminish the quality of
public discourse.
B. The Brandenburg Clear and Present Danger Standard
Undermines Beauharnais
By 1969, the Supreme Court implicitly negated the holding
in Beauharnais that group libel is beyond the realm of first
amendment protection. 122 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 2' the Court
significantly expanded first amendment protection of extremist
speech by extending this protection to threats of racist revenge at
120. Riesman, supra note 117, at 729 (footnote omitted). For example, Riesman
writes that:
In the Rise of the Nazis to power in Germany, defamation was a major weapon.
It took various forms. . . . [M]en were hounded to the point of initiating prose-
cutions for libel against their detractors, who had the advantage of influence
with the reactionary courts, and who utilized the courtroom as a platform for
their propaganda without fear of being sentenced for contempt.
Id. at 728-29 (footnotes omitted).
121. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258-59.
122. Beauharnais is discussed supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
123. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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a Ku Klux Klan rally.124 The Brandenburg decision assures that
speech defaming a racial, ethnic or religious group will be pro-
tected if it stops short of meeting the heightened clear and present
danger standard.125 The government may prosecute only when
such speech is directed to incite or is likely to result in imminent
and serious danger . 26 Although Brandenburg does not directly
address the validity of group libel statutes, it implicitly under-
mines their legitimacy by extending first amendment protection to
the object they regulate. Brandenburg substantially narrows the
window of group libel that may be regulated. While, it cannot be
assumed that group libel statutes can never be justifiably applied,
by assigning some constitutional protection to this speech, Bran-
denburg requires a greater showing of harm than that required by
the Beauharnais rational basis standard.127
If the Brandenburg clear and present danger standard alone
were used to assess the validity of the Michigan policy, it is nearly
certain that the university would be unable to sustain the rule to
control situations for which it was designed. The requisite degree
of harm would not be present. Under the Brandenburg test, only
the imminence of violence or serious injury to the state would be
sufficient justification to punish racist speech. In the Michigan
leaflet incident, 2 8 the women who read the insults against their
heritage were not threatened with imminent physical violence.
The injury they experienced was purely psychological. The pri-
mary purpose of the Michigan policy was not to curb physical vio-
lence, but rather to protect the university community from racial
124. Id. at 444-45. The Court reversed the conviction of Brandenburg, a Ku Klux
Klan leader, who had been convicted under an Ohio statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the
duty, necessity, or, propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism
as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily as-
sembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate
the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id.
125. Id. at 447.
126. Id. at 447 n.2 (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) and Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) as decisions that "fashioned the principle that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or
proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action").
127. The rational basis standard employed in Beauharnais allows the legislature to
assume harm without proof. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 262 (1952). The
Brandenburg clear and present danger standard requires that the harm or potential for
harm be empirically demonstrated. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49.
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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discord and the personal psychological distress that results from
racial insults.129
In Cohen v. California,130 the Supreme Court implicitly re-
jected the argument that psychological abuse is the practical
equivalent of a physical assault by holding that offending sensibili-
ties is simply not enough to justify suppression of speech.' 31 Cohen
was convicted for wearing a jacket decorated with the words
"Fuck the Draft" into a Los Angeles Courthouse. 13 2 The Court
held that this expression was a legitimate exercise of first amend-
ment rights and reversed the conviction. 33 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court expressly considered whether Cohen's message was
directed at insulting any particular audience. The Court
explained:
No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably
have regarded the words on [Cohen's] jacket as a direct personal
insult. Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of the
State's police power to prevent a speaker from intentionally pro-
voking a given group to hostile reaction."
This "captive audience"' 3 5 argument would have been more con-
vincing if, for example, Cohen's jacket had read, "Fuck the Jews"
because this epithet singles out a defined group for ridicule 36 and
does not carry with it the political overtones of targeting govern-
ment policy.
Since Cohen, the Court has held that, in certain situations,
offending sensibilities is enough to justify restricting speech. 13 7
129. MICHIGAN POLICY, supra note 4, preamble.
130. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
131. Id. at 23-26. Some medical experts contend that psychological attacks are more
devastating than physical injuries. Dr. Howard Ehrlich, Director of the National Institute
Against Prejudice and Violence, explains that "[a] broken bone can heal in a few months,
but psychological injuries are more intense and longer lasting." Wilkerson, supra note 2, §
1, at 34, col. 1.
132. 403 U.S. at 16.
133. Id. at 26.
134. Id. at 20 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 21.
136. See Arkes, supra note 18, at 315 (asserting that the statement in Cohen attacks
an impersonal institution rather than singling out particular persons for ridicule).
137. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). This case involved a comedy
routine broadcast over the radio in which George Carlin's monologue satirized the Puritan
view of language of the broadcast media by reading off the words that could not be said on
public airwaves. Id. at 729. The Court classified the routine, not as obscene, but as inde-
cent since it was broadcast during daytime hours when children may have been easily ex-
posed to it. Id. at 738-41. Although the Court conceded that the monologue should be
protected in other contexts, protecting the sensibilities of the broadcast audience was con-
[Vol. 40:733
RACIAL SPEECH ON CAMPUS
The Court will sometimes permit regulation based on psychologi-
cal harm even though the incident falls far short of creating any
sort of clear and present danger of imminent violence.138 This
trend indicates that psychological harm on campus may be recog-
nized as creating enough damage to justify university anti-racism
policies.
C. The Clear and Present Danger Test Cannot Appropriately
Address the Problem
It is not certain that the Court would apply the Brandenburg
standard in assessing a challenge to the validity of the group defa-
mation rules. The range of expressive acts is so wide that it is
impossible to find a single test that is universally appropriate.' 39
Professor Kalven has written that the clear and present danger
sidered enough to regulate this type of expression over the radio. Id. at 748-50. See also
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (holding that a New York statute prohibit-
ing persons from knowingly promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age of 16
by distributing material which depicts such a performance did not violate the first amend-
ment); Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1963) (holding that ordi-
nances providing that an "adult theater" could not be located within 1,000 feet of any two
other "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of a residential area were not invalid under the
first amendment); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1974) (holding that
obscene films were not speech entitled to first amendment protection, and states have a
legitimate interest in regulating exhibition of obscene material in public places). Professor
Schauer asserts that "[a]fter Young and Pacifica, . . it certainly appears that offensive
speech is a subcategory in which restrictions will be permitted." Schauer, Categories,
supra note 20, at 292-93.
138. Yet in Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206-07 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 915 (1978), the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument that a Nazi march
through Skokie, a predominately Jewish community outside Chicago, would create an un-
acceptable level of psychological harm. The apologetic tone of the opinion suggests the
court's discomfort in applying the clear and present danger test to this problem. See L.
BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 28-29, 71, 88, 134, 232 (addressing the significance of the
judges' personal dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case). For a discussion of the failed
constitutional arguments presented in this case and suggestions of how it may have come
out differently, see Lasson, Racial Defamation, supra note 66, at 15-20. But see A. NEIER,
DEFENDING MY ENEMY 54-68 (1979) for a defense of the Collin decision.
139. Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT.
REv. 285, 287 [hereinafter, Schauer, Codifying] ("[T]he diversity of communicative activ-
ity and governmental concerns is so wide as to make it implausible to apply the same tests
or analytical tools to the entire range of First Amendment problems."). Professor Schauer
considers one of the most important trends in recent first amendment jurisprudence to be
the recognition that since not all speech merits the same degree of protection, some expres-
sion should be "subject to control under standards less stringent than clear and present
danger in any form." Id. at 306. He adds that "the First Amendment is becoming increas-
ingly intricate, which has prompted one scholar to observe pejoratively that First Amend-
ment doctrine is beginning to resemble the Internal Revenue Code." Id. at 309 (footnote
omitted).
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test is an inappropriate response to the problem of group libel.
It is too simplistic for the problem at hand. It requires the point-
ing to some specific evil engendered by the speech, such as a
breach of peace; but although group libel may on occasion be
productive of a breach of peace, this approach to it focuses on
the wrong evil. Group libels would be exactly as odious, antiso-
cial, and dangerous even though they were never to be a breach
of peace. Further, if we attempt to substitute the evil of racial
hatred and tension and prejudice in order to get an immediate
evil, we may be talking sensibly about systematic group libel but
this logical turn deprives the test of any bite . . . . More impor-
tant, it has never been clear that clear and present danger was
offered as the criterion for all forms of speech problems so that
we could say any speech which does not present a clear and pre-
sent danger of overt conduct is constitutionally untouchable. 4"
Since the clear and present danger test was designed for cases
involving advocacy of law violation that promote harmful physical
acts such as obstructing the draft, 41 the test is often assumed to
be inappropriate for first amendment issues involving primarily
psychological harm, such as that caused by obscenity. 142
Inciting violence is not the only way that extremist speech
140. H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 44 (1965). Professor
Schauer agrees that problems involving defamation "do not fit neatly into a 'clear and
present danger' type standard of review." Schauer, Categories, supra note 20, at 292. For
more general criticisms on applying the clear and present danger test in this context, see
Arkes, supra note 19, at 323 (asserting that this test teaches us "that, before citizens can
expect the law to protect them or to vindicate their interests, they must prepare themselves
to use violence outside the law").
141. In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), involving a conviction for
draft obstruction, the Court articulated the first version of the clear and present danger
test: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. In Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919), the Court cites Schenck in convicting the defendant for
conspiracy to obstruct military recruiting. Also, in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
371 (1927), the clear and present danger test was applied to convict the defendant for
belonging to a group which advocated the overthrow of the government.
142. See Schauer, Codifying, supra note 139, at 305, in which the author states,
"[n]ot every enormous state interest can fit neatly into Brandenburg's incitement-immedi-
acy-inevitability formula, and other versions of the general clear and present danger
formula may remain viable for special or novel circumstances." In support of this proposi-
tion, Professor Schauer cites United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis. 1979), mandamus denied sub noma., Morland v. Sprecher, 443 U.S. 709 (1979), dis-
missed, 610 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1979), and Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free
Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1982). Schauer, Codifying, supra note 139, at 305
n.109.
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can injure a community. 43 Dean Lee Bollinger has written about
the divisive effects of extremist speech on community cohesion. He
points out that speech "can destroy the collective bonds that nor-
mally hold society together . . . [In Collin] one of the risks of
the Nazi march was the disruption of the peaceful coexistence
that had tentatively been maintained in the community between
Jews, Christians, and blacks."144 Dean Bollinger criticizes the cur-
rent doctrinal structure for failing to account for these other
harms. 45
Similarly, applying the clear and present danger test in the
university setting would not solve the problem because the test
overlooks the critical psychological tension between free expres-
sion and ethnic integrity. In reaction to the divisive effects of ra-
cist speech, many universities have weighed the competing inter-
ests and determined that minimizing racial discord is more
important than maintaining absolute first amendment rights on
campus.14 James Freedman, the President of Dartmouth College
said that curbing racism in a student publication is not a question
of freedom of expression when the "newspaper recklessly sets out
to create a climate of intolerance and intimidation that destroys
our mutual sense of community and inhibits the reasoned exami-
nation of the widest possible range of ideas."""
Compounding the effects that racism has on community co-
hesion are the psychological effects that take their toll on the indi-
vidual members of minority groups. As a result of the increase in
racist incidents on college campuses, "black students say they feel
143. L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 179.
144. Id. at 191 (discussing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978) where the Nazi organization was given the right to march in
Skokie, Illinois, a small, predominately Jewish community).
145. See id. at 191-93 (criticizing the non-recognition of legitimate societal harm in
the current doctrinal structure, and suggesting that the definition of "danger" in the clear
and present danger test be broad and flexible enough to encompass a wide variety of social
harm from speech).
146. This is evidenced by the rise in establishment of university anti-discrimination
policies. See supra notes 11 & 22.
147. Gold, Dartmouth President Faults Right-Wing Student Journal, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 1988, § A, at 16, col. 4. Although Dartmouth is a private institution, the senti-
ments of Dartmouth's President, James Freedman, are relevant in view of the notorious
racial tensions at Dartmouth. In 1988, Dartmouth suspended several students for harassing
a black music Professor. Casey, At Dartmouth the Clash of '89, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1989, § 6, at 28, col. 1. On January 3, 1989, a New Hampshire judge ordered that two of
the suspended students be readmitted. Id.
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increasingly like outsiders, isolated and unwelcome."'14 Black stu-
dents tend to have a far less positive experience at white universi-
ties than their white peers.14 Dr. Howard Ehrlich, a psychologist
and Director of the National Institute Against Prejudice and Vio-
lence, finds that withdrawal is the predominant reaction to a racist
environment. 5 0 Along with this diminished involvement in campus
life comes a profound sense of low self-esteem. A recent survey of
black students at sixteen white colleges reported "only 12 percent
of black students, as against a majority of whites, said they felt
they were an important part of campus life.""'
Another problem with applying the clear and present danger.
test in this context is that it targets only the trigger of violence
instead of all the events that may have contributed to heightened
racial tension. While racist speech may not always lead to imme-
diate danger, every epithet, especially when well publicized,
heightens racial tensions and contributes to a climate which often
degenerates into violence.' 52 Prominent psychological and socio-
logical theorists stress that racist expression is "a precondition for
acts of racial violence."' 15 3
148. Wilkerson, supra note 2 § I, at 34, col. 1.
149. Graham, Baker, and Wapner, Prior Interracial Experience and Black Student
Transition Into Predominantly White Colleges, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
1146, 1147 (1985). The authors observe that:
Almost all of the studies ... report that black students in white colleges, by
comparison with white students in the same colleges or black students in
predominantly black colleges, experience more difficulty in the various aspects of
adjustment, perform less well academically, are generally less satisfied with col-
lege, perceive the university climate more negatively, and have higher drop-out
rates.
Id.
150. Wilkerson, supra note 2, § 1, at 34, col. 1.
151. Id. One Michigan student described his reaction to racist events in remarkably
personal terms: "White students say, 'Michigan is great; it's awesome,'. . . . But I just
want to get my education and get out of here. This is their place, not mine." Id. § 1, at 1,
col. 2.
152. See Arkes, supra note 19, at 283. Professor Arkes observes:
It may be hard to make a precise connection in any case between the suffering of
a harm and any particular publication that might have helped to sustain (or
create) a climate of prejudice from which injuries may arise. In the nature of
things, the lines of causation here cannot be drawn with exactness between par-
ticular events, and many of the harms that result from the defamation of groups
may not crop up until years after the fact.
Id. For several recent examples of racial violence on campus, see notes 2 and 7 and accom-
panying text.
153. Kretzmer, supra note 43, at 463. Professor Kretzmer cites the social psycholo-
gists Gordon W. Allport and Neil J. Smelsmer for their empirical studies showing that
people engage in racist acts more easily when they have participated in milder levels of
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The clear and present danger test is also problematic when
applied to racist speech because physical violence on behalf of a
victim is unlikely in a situation where a minority is the target.154
Speech falling within the "fighting words" category, that may be
regulated, will be different in a situation where the parties are on
unequal ground and the victim is likely to turn the other cheek.
Racist speech is so common that it is not seen as fighting words
but rather as part of the ordinary conflict people are expected to
tolerate.15 5 Ironically, if minorities were to react violently, the ra-
cist speaker could be punished through either the "fighting words"
exception or the clear and present danger test. However, the re-
sponse to dehumanizing racist language is often withdrawal rather
than a fight.15 6 Targets choose to avoid racist encounters whenever
possible, internalizing the harm rather than escalating the con-
flict. 57 Refusing a fight and admirable self-restraint then denotes
the racist words as non-actionable. In this way, self-defensive
withdrawal erects a constitutional wall that isolates minorities
from state protection.
The clear and present danger test will never be a satisfactory
response to complex psychological problems unless we give the
"imminency" and "danger" elements a more flexible and sensitive
reading."58 As originally conceived, the Court could take account
of such harm because the clear and present danger test was in-
tended to incorporate the idea that "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done."' 59 However,
as refined in Brandenburg, the test has become too rigid a formu-
lation to respond to issues involving primarily psychological
damage.
Until Beauharnais is either reinforced or overruled, the legal
validity of statutes aimed at curtailing group libel will remain a
prejudice conduct such as racist speech. Id. at 462-65.
154. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2337.
155. See id.
156. See id. ("In order to avoid receiving hate messages, victims have had to...
modify their behavior and demeanor.").
157. See id. ("The recipient of hate messages struggles with inner turmoil.").
158. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 193 ("[Tihe 'clear and present danger'
standard ... seems a perfectly appropriate formulation, provided we give the term danger
the wide and sensitive compass it ought to have.").
159. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (the defendants were con-
victed of conspiring to cause insubordination in the military by printing and circulating a
document encouraging recruits to resist the draft).
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fertile source of dispute.160 The fact that the Court has repeatedly
refused to overrule Beauharnais illustrates the Court's reticence to
apply the Brandenburg clear and present danger test to all types
of expression.' Although many commentators have suggested
that the New York Times decision or the heightened clear and
present danger standard marked the end of Beauharnais, the
Court continues to mention Beauharnais approvingly. 6 2 Assum-
ing that the Court concurs that the Brandenburg test is poorly
tailored to cases involving psychological harm and that group libel
in the university context is more analogous to private than public
libel, the basic principle of Beauharnais that racist epithets are
low-value speech remains as a legitimate foundation for examin-
ing an appropriate judicial response for state action against the
problem of racist speech.
III. THE UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT AFFECTS FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The validity of the university anti-racism policies may ulti-
mately turn on how the special environment 63 of the university
160. See Bollinger, supra note 88, at 621 ("As long as Beauharnais exists, at least,
the law must be taken to be somewhat unsettled.").
161. See H. KALVEN, supra note 140, at 44 ("[I]t has never been clear that clear
and present danger was offered as the criterion for all forms of speech problems .... ").
162. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (citing Beauharnais
for the proposition that libelous publications about private individuals are not protected by
the Constitution); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964) (citing the statute in
Beauharnais as one which is narrowly drawn).
163. The Court has developed a three-tiered environmental analysis for first amend-
ment purposes, each with a separate standard of review. The first tier is the traditional
public forum. This designation is given to public property such as streets and parks where a
sort of first amendment easement has attached from centuries of use as a forum of public
expression. Justice Roberts established this principle in his famous dictum in Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939). He reasoned that public lands
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use. . . has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515.
Except for certain absolute prohibitions to further compelling government interests, the
only permitted regulations in a public forum are reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions that leave open alternative channels of communication, are content-neutral, and
"are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest." United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
The second tier is the equal access forum. In this type of environment, the government
need not protect speech, but once the government opens the forum, all speakers must be
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alters the application of first amendment principles. This contex-
tual analysis may be decisive regardless of whether or not the reg-
ulation of racist epithets is deemed to be a legitimate content-
based regulation. Even if racist epithets are found generally to be
worthy of first amendment protection, courts may find that ex-
tending this protection is inappropriate when racist speech jeopar-
dizes the compelling goals of an academic institution. In shifting
to a context-based analysis, we must ask whether there is some-
thing unique about the university setting that makes the interests
of the state compelling enough to curtail students' first amend-
ment rights.
The Court has recognized that because universities have tra-
ditionally been treated similarly to public forums the broadest first
amendment protections should apply to university students. 64 For
if any open and accessible marketplace of ideas still exists, it is
the American university.165 According to this argument, permit-
ting universities to maintain their anti-racism codes would close
the forum to some students.
Preserving free debate on campus is also a strong motivating
factor in favor of anti-racism policies. Universities will benefit
from policies that are specifically tailored to maintain openness by
treated equally.
Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government
may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they
intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on
content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone.
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
In the third tier, often called the non-public forum, regulations must be viewpoint
neutral and reasonable. In this tier, the government may, in addition to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions, "reserve the forum for its intended purposes . . .as long as
the regulation on speech is reasonable and [is] not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citation omitted).
Applying public forum analysis to the university environment would significantly com-
plicate the analysis for it would involve breaking the university down into its different envi-
ronmental components. Under public forum analysis, the various areas and institutions of
the university - such as campus media, classrooms and dormitories - would each have to
be assessed individually.
164. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981) (noting that "the
campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the characteristics
of a public forum"). Some conservatives take this argument further, and assert that efforts
to curb racist speech amount to "ideological indoctrination." Finn, supra note 11, at 19
(arguing that universities' efforts to curb racist speech will restrict open discussion that is
the hallmark of the American university).
165. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (noting that the
"classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' ").
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discouraging only exclusionary speech.166 For in addition to alien-
ating minority students from the community, speech that pro-
motes racial tensions breeds divisiveness and disorder that disrupts
the educational process. 6 7
The Court has held that in certain special environments,
speech that normally warrants first amendment protection may be
regualted when it interferes with the special goals of the institu-
tion. For example, the unique purposes of certain institutions such
as military bases,1 68 prisons,16 9 and schools,170 justify restricting
these environments for first amendment purposes to a degree that
is unwarranted on public streets and in parks.17 Therefore, the
same speech that is protected in some forums can be regulated in
other forums. 72 Thus racist speech that is disruptive enough to
thwart educational purposes should be regulated at public univer-
sities, but remain protected in traditional public forums. In Tinker
v. Des Moines School District, the Court gave public schools the
authority to punish expression if the school demonstrates that the
verbal conduct "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school.' 73 For such a prohibition to be valid, the school must
show that the regulation is based on "more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint.' 7 4
The Tinker standard, which was specifically addressed to the
high school setting, was extended to state universities in Healy v.
166. See supra note 11 (discussing these policies).
167. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
168. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding Army regulations banning
political speeches and demonstrations on military bases as constitutional).
169. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding use of Florida trespass
statute to prohibit demonstration on jail premises constitutional).
170. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)
(holding that agreement giving teachers' union preferential access to an interschool mail
system is constitutional).
171. In Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), Justice Black conceded that
government
may protect the public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct that
disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people either for homes, wherein
they can escape the hurly-burly of the outside business and political world, or for
public and other buildings that require peace and quiet to carry out their func-
tions, such as courts, libraries, schools, and hospitals.
Id. at 118 (Black, J., concurring).
172. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 12-24, at 987.
173. 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
174. Id. at 509
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James.175 In Healy, the Court ruled that colleges can regulate
speech that poses "a substantial threat of material disruption" to
the educational process. 176 Furthermore,
a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of
the characteristics of a public forum. . . . [However, a] univer-
sity differs in significant respects from public forums such as
streets, parks, or even municipal theaters. A university's mission
is education, and [it may] impose reasonable regulations com-
patible with that mission upon the use of its campus and
facilities. 1"
This holding is consistent with the characteristic deference the
Court gives to university faculty decisions. 18 The Court justifies
this relaxed standard of review by asserting that a liberal ap-
proach keeps the activities of an educational institution consistent
with its intended purposes.1 79
For a court to sustain an anti-racism policy under the current
standard of review, the university must show that racist epithets
materially disrupt the educational environment. To accomplish
this, universities should assert that regulating racist speech is jus-
tified by compelling educational interests such as maintaining or-
der, attracting a diverse student body, avoiding the perpetuation
of racist stigma, and minimizing psychological harm both to indi-
viduals and the community. The merits of each of these interests
will be discussed separately.
175. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
176. Id. at 189. The Court noted that merely unpopular views could not be regu-
lated: "The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech
or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent."
Id. at 187-88. But the Court also noted that if the speech is directed toward action, as
opposed to discussion, regulation of the speech would be permissible. Id. "In the context of
the 'special characteristics of the school environment,' the power of the government to pro-
hibit 'lawless action' is not limited to acts of a criminal nature. Also prohibitable are ac-
tions which 'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.'"
Id. at 189 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
177. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n.5 (1981).
178. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)
(stating that "[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision . . . they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment"). The
Ewing Court concluded that this "narrow avenue for judicial review" precluded it from
overturning a university decision in the absence of "a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms." Id. at 227.
179. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(reasonable time, place, and manner restriction allowing teachers' union preferential access
to interschool mail system is consistent with its intended purpose).
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A. The Interest of Maintaining Order on Campus
Racial tensions across the United States have bred dissension
on campus, often resulting in violence against black students. At
the University of Massachusetts in Amherst, for example, violence
erupted just after the New York Mets defeated the Boston Red
Sox in the 1986 World Series. A reporter observed, "hundreds of
students, many of them drunk, poured out of the dorms. White
Red Sox fans began shoving Mets fans who were black; soon a
white mob of 3,000 was chasing and beating anyone who was
black."18 One student "recalls thinking, 'My God, my life is be-
ing threatened here - and it's because I'm black.' "181 At the
University of Mississippi, an arsonist's fire gutted a house belong-
ing to the first black fraternity to locate on fraternity row. l8 Dur-
ing a student election at the University of California-Los Angeles
in the Spring of 1988, months of racial tensions violently erupted
into a brawl that involved more than 200 students.' In 1988 at
the University of Massachusetts, a white female student and two
black male students who attended a party together were attacked
by six white students.8 These incidents reflect the urgent need to
diffuse racism on campus. Because each epithet increases racial
tension, which increases the likelihood of violence, universities
have a compelling interest in restricting racist speech to maintain
order on campus.
The argument that racist speech should be regulated to main-
tain order on campus will ultimately encounter the clear and pre-
sent danger test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio.'85 The inevita-
ble stumbling block is that a claim of potential violence triggers
the Brandenburg test which requires showing of harm or potential
180. Weiner, supra note 3, at 260.
181. Id. (quoting a black student named Joseph Andrade).
182. Raspberry, Wheels Turning in Mississippi, The Plain Dealer, Sept. 16, 1988, §
C, at 13, col. 1.
183. "Voting booths were upended, ballot boxes grabbed and blows exchanged at
UCLA . . as more than 200 students disrupted an undergraduate presidential election in
a protest that campus leaders said was the outgrowth of months of racial tension." Racial
Tension Erupts in Melee at UCLA, L.A. Times, May 27, 1988, at 1, col. 1. The demon-
strators were angry because their candidate, a Latino, was disqualified for not having
enough college credits or sufficient grades. Id.
184. Rezendes, supra note 10, § A, at 2, col. 1. In response, "200 angry minority
students took over [the] New Africa House, demanding tougher prohibitions against racial
harassment." Id.
185. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
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imminent or serious danger."86 Once Brandenburg is invoked, the
focus shifts from psychological to physical harm.187 Under the
Brandenburg test, universities could act to diffuse racism only
when tensions become so uncontrollable that physical violence ap-
pears to be the only solution.
The Brandenburg approach is unsatisfactory because it ig-
nores the reality of how racial tensions evolve and eventually take
hold of a community. It is the accumulation of racist sentiment, as
opposed to an isolated incident, that creates the hostile environ-
ment. Professor Matsuda notes that racist incidents on university
campuses are "rarely isolated" occurrences,'88 and that "[l]ess
egregious forms of racism degenerate easily into more serious
forms."' 89 To illustrate the connection between racist words and
racist deeds, Professor Matsuda points out that the killing of a
California high school student, Thong Hy Huynh, "after months
of anti-Asian racial slurs" was no accident.190 To steer courts
away from the analytical domain of Brandenburg, universities
may argue that restricting racist speech is a compelling interest
because it may minimize racial tensions before they escalate
violently.
B. The Need to Attract and Keep a Diverse Student Body
The interest in regulating racist speech is especially compel-
ling to universities because a divisive racist climate undermines
the central function of the institution - education. A university
maintains an open marketplace of ideas in part to the degree that
it brings in students from various backgrounds. University admin-
istrators use anti-discrimination policies to create a welcoming
and supportive atmosphere for minority students that will en-
courage their participation in the university community. By bring-
ing together students with diverse backgrounds, the spectrum of
ideas widens and the educational process flourishes.
The Supreme Court has established that universities have a
compelling interest in maintaining a diverse student body. In Re-
gents of the University of California v. Bakke,' 9' the Court as-
186. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
187. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
188. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2327 n.37.
189. Id. at 2335.
190. Id. (footnote omitted).
191. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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serted that "attainment of a diverse student body. . . is a consti-
tutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education."'1 92 Universities hope that passage of anti-racism poli-
cies will help reverse falling minority enrollment. The University
of Wisconsin passed an anti-discrimination policy in part because
minorities were turning down full scholarships because of racial
tensions on campus.'9 3 With minority enrollment in institutions of
higher education declining despite increasingly vigorous recruit-
ment, 1 4 the interest in attracting and keeping minorities on cam-
pus becomes more significant. The Court has found that encourag-
ing diversity of the student population is a compelling interest
even if such action results in deprivation to individuals among the
majority." 5 In Bakke, the Court ruled that a university may ad-
mit a minority student over an equally qualified white student in
192. Id. at 311-12.
193. Worthington, supra note 7, § C, at 2, col. 2.
194. Robert Meacham, an administrator at the University of Cincinnati believes that
the "means by which we deal with racism will determine whether or not we will have
minority students in higher education." Conference to Combat Campus Racism, Proprie-
tary to the United Press Int'l, Sept. 18, 1989 (quoting Robert Meacham of the University
of Cincinnati). Despite the fact that recruiting minorities has become a top priority in
higher education, minority enrollment does not reflect these efforts.
Although a growing percentage of black students are finishing high school, black
attendance in college is dropping. In 1985 only 26 percent of black high school
graduates went on to college, down from 34 percent in 1976 . . . . While minor-
ity college enrollment expanded slightly between 1980 and 1986, the gain was
mostly because of increased numbers of Asians and Hispanics, not blacks. These
bleak statistics persist despite several decades of intense effort to attract and
retain minority students . . . . By the year 2020, 35 percent of the American
population will be minority, with blacks and Hispanics making up the largest
portion. For society's sake as well as for their own survival, colleges cannot af-
ford to have more than a third of the nation view them as inaccessible or
inhospitable.
Tifft, The Search for Minorities; Despite Increased Wooing, Few Go on to College, TIME,
Aug. 21, 1989, at 64.
195. See Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-15 (1977).
In Bakke, the Court wrote:
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), we upheld a
New York reapportionment plan that was deliberately drawn on the basis of
race to enhance the electoral power of Negroes and Puerto Ricans; the plan had
the effect of diluting the electoral strength of the Hasidic Jewish community.
We were willing in UJO to sanction the remedial use of a racial classification
even though it disadvantaged otherwise "innocent" individuals. In . . . Califano
v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), the Court upheld a provision in the Social
Security laws that discriminated against men because its purpose was "'the per-
missible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of
women.'"
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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the interest of maintaining a diverse class. 196 In seeking to legiti-
mate university anti-racism policies, the same end of diversity of
the student population is sought as in Bakke.
Although the university interests in Bakke and in maintain-
ing the anti-racism policies are identical, the cases can be distin-
guished by the harm generated. In Bakke, the Court held that
"innocent individuals" of the majority who took no part in past
societal discrimination may be legitimately denied admission. 9 7
The Court should be more willing to curb student rights in the
Michigan leaflet and similar incidents because the speaker is seek-
ing to perpetuate past discrimination and thereby plays an active
role in promoting the harm that the university is attempting to
eradicate.
A narrowly defined anti-racism policy would only deter racist
speech aimed at excluding others. Therefore, the policies would
not be ones of exclusion, but ones of reciprocal inclusion. When
the harm generated by such policies is viewed in this broader con-
text, it is clear that a much greater harm - the exclusion of inno-
cent individuals from the university community - may be justifi-
ably avoided in the interest of maintaining diversity of the student
population at public universities. Since the University's interest in
diversity is compelling enough to exclude qualified members, re-
stricting the small range of exclusionary speech so that minority
students have equal participatory rights is equally, if not more,
compelling.
C. The Interest in Avoiding the Perpetuation of Racist Stigma
Since 1879, stigma has been recognized as a constitutionally
significant harm. 98 In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court held
that American citizens have an absolute right to be exempt from
state "legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society,
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which
others enjoy."' 99 Since then, judicial concern about stigma en-
196. Id. at 311-15.
197. Id. at 307.
198. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). See generally Marshall,
Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 78, 94 (1986) ("Stigma
was first recognized as a constitutionally significant injury when a state itself created or
perpetuated negative stereotypes.").
199. 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). The Strauder Court reasoned that singling people
out based on race "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of
their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
couraged through state action has broadened to include stigma
perpetuated by ordinary citizens.200 Judicial dedication to avoiding
stigma is based on the belief that divisions based on immutable
characteristics "are contrary to our deep belief that 'legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or
wrongdoing.' "201 One of the most deleterious effects of permitting
racial epithets to go unpunished is that they perpetuate racial ster-
eotyping. In view of this effect on the university environment, uni-
versities have a compelling interest in eradicating racial stigmas
by way of anti-racism policies.
D. Minimizing the Psychological Harm that Affects
Individuals and Campus Unity
As a final defense of university anti-racism policies, the uni-
versity may argue that racial epithets result in substantial harm
that significantly affects community cohesion and individual ad-
justment to college life.202 Although the judiciary has traditionally
treated racist threats under the category of group libel as a diffuse
and indiscernible harm, substantial psychological, sociological and
political effects result from racial insults.203 Racist epithets aimed
at groups may have an even more deleterious effect than individ-
ual insults since they paint negative stereotypes with a "broader
brush."20 4
The harms resulting from racial threats may be considerably
amplified in a university environment. The minority groups
targeted by these insults tend to be so poorly represented that the
to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others." Id.
200. See Marshall, supra note 198, at 94 ("[T]he concern was that officially sanc-
tioning discrimination imbues it with a legitimacy that perpetuates similar treatment in
purely private conduct.").
201. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (citations
omitted) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.).
202. See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
203. See Delgado, supra note 64, at 135-39 (pointing to the psychological harms
caused by racial stigmatization to support an independent tort action for racial insults).
204. Arkes, supra note 19, at 292. Professor Arkes cites authorities confirming the
widespread presence of racial and religious stereotypes. Id. He then points out:
When blacks were commonly turned away from hotels and other public accom-
modations - the black middle class and professional people as well as the poor
and uneducated - one may seriously wonder whether the clerks behind the
counters were responding to these people as individuals or whether they were
responding largely to a category into which these people had been thrust, and in
which they had been stigmatized as a group.
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harm falls on the shoulders of a small number of individuals.
Therefore, alienation resulting from racial insults on college cam-
puses can be closely analogized to the harm resulting from indi-
vidual libel, which is an accepted basis for state regulation. Fur-
thermore, victims of racism often suffer "physiological symptoms
and emotional distress ranging from [deep] fear, rapid pulse rate
and difficulty in breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress dis-
order, hypertension, psychosis, and suicide."2 5 Professor Matsuda
calls specific attention to a California Attorney General's report
finding that racist epithets "'cause deep emotional scarring and
bring feelings of intimidation and fear that pervade every aspect
of a victim's life.' "206 The reaction of minority students to racist
incidents supports this conclusion. When a black Denison Univer-
sity student was awakened in the middle of the night by racist
epithets yelled through his dormitory room wall, he said, "I felt I
had been mentally, spiritually and emotionally raped. Everything
about my personhood had been mauled. 20 7 College students often
enter college psychologically vulnerable because they are away
from home for the first time. 08 This vulnerability is reflected in
the fact that minority students feel victimized when any member
of their cultural group becomes a target of racism: A black stu-
dent at the University of Texas at Austin, says, "Overt racial inci-
dents can have a real psychological effect, even if they don't hap-
pen to you. '209
When the university fails to act to diminish the harm caused
by racial incidents, the damage becomes more acute. At the
Madison campus of the University of Wisconsin, a student spokes-
man for the Minority Coalition, said, "By hiding behind the issue
of free speech, the administration is making this campus safe for
racism. ' 210 Professor Matsuda agrees that "[o]fficial tolerance of
racist speech in [the university] setting is more harmful than gen-
eralized tolerance in the community-at-large. It is harmful to stu-
205. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2336 (citations omitted).
206. Id. at 2336 n.84 (quoting PACIFIC ISLANDER ADVISORY COMM., OFFICE OF AT-
TORNEY GEN., CAL DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 45 (1988)).
207. Waters, Campus Racism Disturbs Minorities, The Plain Dealer, Feb. 5, 1990,
§ B, at 2, col. 4 (quoting Aaron Laramore, the Chief Minister of Denison's Black Student
Union).
208. See Matsuda, supra note 1, at 3270 (Universities are "special places" that raise
a variety of concerns due, in large part, to the psychological vulnerability of young adults.).
209. Tifft, supra note 193, at 64 (quoting student John Jackson).
210. Weiner, supra note 3, at 260 (quoting Peter Chen, spokesperson for the Minor-
ity Coalition at the University of Wisconsin-Madison).
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dent perpetrators in that it is a lesson in getting-away-with-it that
will have lifelong repercussions." 21' It is harmful to targets, who
perceive the university as supporting racism through inaction, and
who are left to their own resources in coping with the damage
wrought.212
Recognizing that official university tolerance looks like pas-
sive complicity with racism, university administrators promote
anti-racism policies as actions reflecting university support for mi-
norities and criticism of racially motivated verbal attacks. For ex-
ample, the President of the University of Wisconsin, Kenneth
Shaw, promotes the university's regulation of racial speech be-
cause its policy "can particularly send a message to minority stu-
dents that the board and its administrators do care."2'1 3
The passage of university anti-racism policies reflects a spe-
cial sensitivity to the needs of minorities in much the same way as
heightened judicial review of laws discriminating against minori-
ties.21 4 Given that the Supreme Court has determined that private
individuals are more vulnerable to harm from defamatory speech
than are public figures,21 it would be logical for a court to find
that members of a minority group are more vulnerable to the dele-
terious effects of exclusionary speech than members of the major-
ity. An illustration of this concept can be seen through the com-
parison of two hypothetical political leaflets. "A" distributes a
leaflet saying that men are inferior to women, and therefore
should not have the right to vote. "B" distributes a leaflet saying
that blacks are inferior to whites, and therefore should not have
the right to vote. The group targeted by B will incur more harm
than the group targeted by A, simply as a reflection of recent his-
tory. While men have traditionally enjoyed suffrage throughout
this country's history, blacks have been subject to governmental
measures that prevented them from voting. Therefore, blacks are
more likely to believe B's expression threatens their participatory
211. Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2371.
212. See id. at 2336.
213. Finn, supra note 11, at 17 (quoting Kenneth Shaw, President of the University
of Wisconsin).
214. In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938) for
example, Justice Stone wrote that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." Id. at 152-53 n.4 (1938).
215. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 244 (1974) (holding that states
may punish defamation directed at private individuals); supra notes 106-10 and accompa-
nying text.
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voice, and the state may realistically conclude that the threat
from B's leaflet will exceed that from A's leaflet. Consequently, in
the interest of minimizing racial tensions, a state or a university
may deem it necessary to protect minorities against extremist
speech.
IV. A MODEL UNIVERSITY ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICY
In analyzing the philosophies underlying the first amendment
and its modern legal doctrine, persuasive arguments have emerged
in favor of university regulation of racist speech. For an anti-dis-
crimination policy to be judicially accepted, it must be sufficiently
narrow to avoid infringing on speech that merits first amendment
protection. The Michigan policy prohibiting "racial threats" '216
was deemed facially invalid for being overly broad.21 7 This over-
breadth problem does not arise in the model policy presented be-
low, which punishes racist epithets, but allows racial ideas to be
expressed in a form that invites a response. The model policy does
not undermine any of the underlying first amendment rationales
because only racism expressed for the purposes of insult and ex-
clusion is punishable.
This Model University Anti-Racism Policy prohibits any written
or spoken expression which is:
1. Targeted at a religious, racial or historically oppressed
group; and
2. Derogatory to the point where the expression directly or
impliedly denies the humanity of the group; and
3. Expressed in an exclusionary manner which threatens the
academic or social participation of the targeted group.
The introductory clause identifies the type of behavior regu-
lated by this policy. This policy regulates written or spoken words,
caricatures, and symbols, but not physical violence because regu-
lating physical harm to people or property does not involve first
amendment concerns.
The first prong enumerates the various groups that may fall
victim to discriminatory speech. Although most hateful speech
victimizes racial minorities, this model policy is broad enough to
punish epithets that isolate people based on gender, sexual persua-
sion, religion, or national origin.
216. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
217. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-66, (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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The second prong ensures that only derogatory remarks will
be regulated. While most exclusionary speech falls within this cat-
egory, general stereotyping would not. For example, the statement
that blacks are better athletes than whites would not be regulated
because, although the expression conveys a racial attitude, it is not
derogatory. In contrast, the Berkeley incident, in which the white
disc jockey told the black student to "'[g]o back to Oakland,' "21
would be regulated. Even though the actual words appear innocu-
ous, the speaker's obvious intent is to express the idea that since
the student is black, his participation is not welcome at the cam-
pus radio station.
Under the third prong, the first amendment guarantee of free
expression is preserved because racial ideas may be expressed in a
forum that promotes discussion. This prong preserves the opportu-
nity for students to challenge assumptions about racism because
the dialogue is open to all. Classroom or informal discussion about
genetic differences or the validity of affirmative action policies are
protected, as long as the discussion does not deny the participatory
rights of those targeted by the speech. It is this prong that isolates
and protects expressions that advance the policies underlying the
first amendment.
The judge that struck down the Michigan anti-discrimination
policy noted that the policy infringed on constitutionally protected
speech when it was used to punish a student who "openly stated in
a class discussion his belief that homosexuality was a disease and
that he intended to develop a counseling plan for changing gay
clients to straight."2 19 Under the model policy, this type of speech
would not be punishable because there is no intent to exclude the
targeted group from the community. More importantly, the state-
ment was made in a setting where the targeted individuals, or
others troubled by the ideas expressed, could respond in a way
which would aid the speaker and class members in understanding
homophobic stereotypes. While this speech is protected by the
model policy, the speech in the Michigan leaflet would be punish-
able since it was presented in a way that evaded response, and was
clearly intended to exclude minority students from campus life.
218. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
219. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 865.
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CONCLUSION
While content-based restrictions on speech carry a heavy bur-
den of presumptive invalidity before the Court, a university has
compelling arguments for restricting racist epithets. These argu-
ments will only be successful if the Court is convinced that the
clear and present danger standard, in its present form, should not
apply to speech causing purely psychological harm. If this stan-
dard is inapplicable, a university can show that racist epithets
should be subject to regulation because the harm from them is
closely analogous to the harm generated by private libel.
A university's best argument is that in view of falling minor-
ity enrollment, schools must act to attract and keep minorities on
campus. Racist epithets breed racial tensions, thwart goals of stu-
dent diversity, perpetuate stigma, alienate individuals, and segre-
gate the community. Each racist incident substantially contributes
to an environment where minorities feel excluded, and therefore,
cannot perform as academic or social equals. As minorities with-
draw from the mainstream student body, the entire community
suffers from the loss of their unique participatory potential.
Since the participatory rights of some students are severely
jeopardized by racist epithets, the Court should permit this nar-
row area of first amendment expression to be regulated on cam-
pus. University anti-racism policies are far less prejudicial than
other regulations, such as admission standards which effectively
exclude qualified students from schools. Anti-racism policies sim-
ply ensure that all members of the university community have a
voice on campus. Minority students press for passage of these poli-
cies f6r their symbolic value, because to them, administrative apa-
thy looks like vicarious aggression. 220 University anti-racism poli-
cies send the university community a message that there are times
when tolerance goes too far 221 and becomes silence in the face of
injustice.
DEBORAH R. SCHWARTZ
220. See L. BOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 233.
221. Id. at 11, 217, 233. In his introduction, Dean Bollinger writes:
I [do not] want the reader to assume that the view taken here is premised on the
notion that tolerance is always a virtue and intolerance a vice. There are times
when tolerance constitutes moral weakness and is itself properly to be con-
demned, just as there are times when responding "intolerantly" is a sign of ad-
mirable moral strength. . ..
Id. at 11.
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